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FINALITY OF ORDERS ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE FEDERAL
INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE AND RODENTICIDE ACT
Dow Chemical Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 477 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1973)
The Federal Inseoticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)l
requires that all "economic poisons" marketed in interstate commerce
be registered with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).2 A
pesticide must meet certain safety and efficacy standards 3 in order to
be registered.4 The Administrator of the EPA, in conducting continu-
1. 7 U.S.C. § 135-35k (1970) [hereinafter cited as FIFRA]. FIFRA was en-
acted in 1947, ch. 125, § 4b, 61 Stat. 167 (1947), to replace the Insecticides Act of
1910. Since the passage of the antiquated 1910 Act, many pesticides with highly com-
plex chemical formulas had been developed and distributed without the knowledge of
the appropriate agency. The primary purpose of FIFRA was to protect the health and
safety of the public by excluding both ineffective and dangerous pesticides from the mar-
ket by means of provisions for registration of "economic poisons." H.R. REP. No. 313,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1947); S. REP. No. 199, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947).
2. FIFRA was first administered by the Secretary of Agriculture, whose functions
pursuant to the Act were transferred to the Administrator of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency by Reorganization Plan 3 of 1970, § 2(a)(8)(i), 5 U.S.C. App. II
(1970).
3. In the principal case the asserted violation of the standards was "misbranding."
Misbranding occurs, inter alia, when a pesticide's labeling does not provide instructions
and warnings that, when followed, make the product safe for use. 7 U.S.C. § 135
(z) (2) (c), (d), (g) (1970). See generally Save America's Vital Environment, Inc.
v. Butz, 347 F. Supp. 521, 523-25 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
4. Prior to the 1964 amendment of FIFRA, the Secretary could, in order to pro-
tect the public, cancel the registration of any pesticide (termed "economic poison" by
the Act) and notify the registrant of the manner in which the product failed to comply
with the Act. The registrant could then make the necessary corrections or insist that
the product be registered under protest, thereby continuing to market and distribute the
pesticide under the risk of prosecution and criminal penalty. There was no provision
for suspension. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, ch. 125, § 4b, 61
Stat. 167 (1947), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 135b (1970).
Under the pre-1964 system, the Secretary was required to register a product even
though he was convinced that the product was ineffective or dangerous to human life.
Another effect of the registration under protest was to shift to the Secretary the burden
of proving that the product did not meet the efficacy and safety standards required by
the Act. H.R. REP. No. 1125, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 5, 7 (1964); S. REP. No. 573,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1963).
The 1964 amendments, following the principles and procedures of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1970), were designed to give the
Secretary greater power to eliminate dangers to the public, to shift the burden of proof
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ing review of the registered products to assure compliance with the
statutory standards, found that "it did not appear" that plaintiff's herbi-
cide5 complied with the terms of the Act. Pursuant to FIFRA, the
Administrator cancelled 6 the registration of plaintiff's product. To
avoid removal of its product from the market, plaintiff initiated the
first stage of the FIFRA administrative review process7 by filing a peti-
tion requesting referral of the matter to a scientific advisory commit-
tee.8 The committee, in accordance with the Act, conducted an inde-
pendent study of the data provided by the Administrator and all other
pertinent information available and submitted a report recommending
restoration of the registration.' After assessing the committee's re-
to the registrant, and to give the registrant more options than withdrawing his product
from the market or facing possible prosecution. 109 CONG. RFc. 10,242 (1963) (re-
marks of Cong. Rosenthal); id. at 20,079-80 (remarks of Senators Ellender and Ribi-
coff).
5. The product in question was Veon 245, a herbicide containing 2,4,5-trichloro-
phenoxacetic acid, known commonly as 2,4,5-T. Veon 245 is used for the control of
weeds in the production of rice intended for human consumption. 2,4,5-T and its con-
taminant, tetrachlorodibenzoparadioxin (TCDD), have been linked with carcinogenesis,
mutagenesis, and teratogenesis. Suspension and cancellation of several of Dow's other
products accompanied this order, but were not contested.
6. If the Administrator finds an "imminent hazard to the public" in the use of
the pesticide, he may "suspend" registration, which results in the summary removal of
the product from the market. If he determines that there is no imminent hazard, but
"it does not appear that the article or its labeling or other material required to be sub-
mitted" complies with the terms of the Act, he may "cancel" the registration. Cancel-
lation also removes the product from the market unless the registrant takes affirmative
action within thirty days to initiate the administrative review process. If the registrant
promptly contests the Administrator's decision, the cancelled product may be manufac-
tured and sold pendente lite. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1970).
7. Where the Administrator cancels registration, the registrant may select one of
two alternative methods of administrative review. He may either file a petition re-
questing referral of the matter to a scientific advisory committee, or he may file objec-
tions and request a public hearing. Id. The burden of proof in review of cancellation
is on the registrant to show that the pesticide meets the statutory efficacy and safety
standards. Continental Chemiste Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 461 F.2d 331, 335 (7th Cir.
1972); Steams Elec. Paste Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 461 F.2d 293, 304-
05 (7th Cir. 1972).
8. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1970) requires that the advisory committee be selected
by the National Academy of Sciences. The committee must be composed of experts
qualified in the subject matter and of adequately diversified backgrounds. The size of
the committee is determined by the Administrator. The committee must issue a report
within 120 days of request. For regulations governing the advisory committee proce-
dure, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 164.10-.11 (1972).
9. Nine of the ten members of the advisory committee recommended that the reg-
istration be restored with certain limitations on the amount of the contaminant. TCDD,
to be allowed in the 2,4,5-T. The committee found that teratogenetic effects were dose-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/13
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port,10 the Administrator elected to continue the cancellation. 1 Plain-
tiff, rather than filing objections to the Administrator's order and find-
ings and requesting a hearing,12 which is the separate and distinct
second-stage administrative review provided by FIFRA, sought' and
related, that 2,4,5-T did not persist in water, plants, or other parts of the environment,
and that no 2,4,5-T residues were detectable on rough rice fifty days after application
of the herbicide. Brief for Appellee at 16, Dow Chem. Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 477 F.2d
1317 (8th Cir. 1973). Both the dissenting committee member and the Administrator
noted, however, that the committee had failed to weigh the risks of 2,4,5-T against its
benefits. Brief for Appellant at 14.
10. If at this stage the Administrator's determination is favorable to the registrant,
the cancellation will be lifted and no further proceedings will be necessary. If the deci-
sion is adverse, however, the statute provides for a separate and distinct second-stage
administrative review. The registrant has sixty days in which to file objections to the
Administrator's order and findings, and to request a public hearing. If the registrant
chooses not to file objections within the allotted time, the order becomes final for pur-
poses of judicial review. The registrant may be precluded from seeking this review,
however, because of his failure to exhaust the available administrative remedies. Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 591 n.16 (D.C. Cir.
1971). See note 29 infra; cf. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965); Myers v. Beth-
lehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Meekins v. Boire, 320 F.2d 445 (5th
Cir. 1963); Neisloss v. Bush, 293 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Union Oil Co. v. FPC,
236 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1956); Shank v. FPC, 236 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956).
11. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1970) states, in part:
After due consideration of the views of the committee and all other data be-
fore him, the Administrator shall, within ninety days after receipt of the re-
port and recommendations of the advisory committee, make his determination
and issue an order, with findings of fact, with respect to registration of the
article and notify. . . registrant.
Throughout the administrative proceedings, the registrant has the continuing burden
of proving to the satisfaction of the Administrator that his product is safe and effective.
See notes 4 & 7 supra.
12. The purpose of the hearing is to receive evidence material and relevant to the
issues raised by the registrants objections. Following the second-stage review, the Ad-
ministrator must issue a third order based upon substantial evidence adduced at the
hearing. If this determination is also adverse, the registrant may seek judicial review
in an appropriate court of appeals within sixty days. 7 U.S.C. § 135b (1970); 40
C.F.R. §§ 164.4(b)-(e), 164.20-.42 (1972).
13. Dow alleged that the Administrator had failed to perform his statutory duty
pursuant to FIFRA, thereby subverting the statutory scheme and causing immediate and
serious harm to Dow and the public. Dow stated in explanation that, in light of the
recommendations of the advisory committee, the Administrator had only two lawful
options. If he had sufficient data before him to indicate that 2,4,5-T did not meet
statutory safety standards, he was obligated to issue an order cancelling Dow's registra-
tion, with specific findings of fact based on such data. If, on the other hand, he did
not have information sufficient to warrant cancellation, he was obliged to lift the origi-
nal cancellation, thereby affirming Dow's 2,4,5-T registration. Dow alleged that the
Administrator followed neither of these courses, but issued a statement containing
broad conclusions and an order to institute a public hearing, and that the statementWashington University Open Scholarship
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obtained14 equitable relief in federal district court." On appeal
was, in fact, a refusal to make a final judgment on the merits of the cancellation.
Dow sought both a writ of mandamus compelling the Administrator to issue a proper
order containing findings of fact, and an injunction against further proceedings pending
the issuance of the order.
In determining the focus of Dow's complaint, it is worthwhile to consider several
alternatives. The first is that Dow was asserting that the Administrator was attempting
to force Dow into a public hearing not required by statute. This cannot be a legitimate
complaint, however, because if Dow had elected to forego the hearing, it would have
been precluded from judicial review by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. See note 10 supra.
A second possibility is that Dow, bearing the burden of proof, was alleging the Ad-
ministrator's failure, through the issuance of broad conclusions rather than findings of
fact, to narrow the scope of the public hearing. The validity of this complaint may
also be questioned. Both the Administrator and the dissenting member of the advisory
committee noted specifically that the majority of the committee had failed to explore
the benefit coefficient of the cancellation. See note 9 supra.
A third alternative is that, because Dow had no legitimate substantive complaint, it
was merely objecting to technical defects in the form of the Administrator's order. If
this were true, it is likely that all Dow would have gained is a delay in the admin-
istrative proceedings. Pursuant to Dow's allegation of irreparable injury, such a delay
would have only caused them further economic harm.
The last alternative is that Dow felt that the Administrator's discretionary decision
to continue the cancellation was a wrongful disregard of the findings of the advisory
committee. Because the substantive decision was within the discretion of the Adminis-
trator, however, it was necessary to focus on the form prescribed by statute. If Dow
had been able to persuade the court that the Administrator's decision was based on con-
clusions rather than facts, the findings of the advisory committee might have been the
only facts available to the Administrator for reaching his decision. Under those cir-
cumstances it would have been difficult for the Administrator to justify any action
other than lifting the cancellation.
14. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas first sug-
gested that the Administrator enter an additional order explicitly containing findings
of fact as required by statute. The second order was issued and the court, in an unre-
ported opinion, entered its memorandum and order, concluding that the Administrator
had failed to enter an order and findings of fact on the basis of the advisory commit-
tee's report and that the order was thus contrary to the plain language of the statute.
The court directed the Administrator to enter an additional order showing relevant por-
tions of the data being relied on, the manner in which the Administrator's findings
were based on the data, and the manner in which the conclusions were derived from
the findings. Pending issuance of the order, the court directed all proceedings relating
to 2,4,5-T to be held in status quo. Dow Chem. Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 477 F.2d 1317,
1321-22 (8th Cir. 1973).
The district court interpreted the review sections of the Act to permit equitable relief
in these circumstances. Provisions for review are set forth in FIFRA §§ 4(c)-(d), 7
U.S.C. §§ 135b(c)-(d) (1970). Section (c) provides:
Final orders of the Administrator under this section shall be subject to judicial
review, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (d) of this section.
Section (d) states, in part:
In case of actual controversy as to the validity of any order under this sectionhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/13
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by the Administrator, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
and held:' 6  FIFRA precludes judicial review of cancellation orders17
until those orders have become "final.' 8
Statutes delineating regulatory functions of administrative agencies
frequently provide for review of agency action.' 9 One of the primary
any person who will be adversely affected by such order may obtain judicial
review by filing in the United States court of appeals for the circuit wherein
such person resides or has his principle place of business, or in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, within sixtydays after the entry of such order, a petition praying that the order be set
aside in whole or in part . . . . Upon the filing of such petition the court
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm or set aside the order complained
of in whole or in part.
Section (d) father provides that the findings of the Administrator must be sustained
"if supported by substantial evidence when considered on the record as a whole, includ-
ing any report and recommendation of an advisory committee."
In issuing a writ of mandamus, the court based its jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1361
(1970), which provides:
The district courts shall have jurisdiction of any action in the nature of man-
damus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.
The district court, apparently following the ministerial-discretionary distinction in de-
ciding when mandamus may lie, see Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadric, 281 U.S.
206, 218-19 (1930), declared that the congressional doctrine that the Administrator
reach a decision on the basis of the advisory committee report and other data before
him was not discretionary and, hence, mandamus was proper. Dow Chem. Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 477 F.2d 1317, 1322 (8th Cir. 1973).
The district court did not specify the basis for injunctive jurisdiction but the general
utility of the injunction as a means of reviewing administrative action when no other
form of review proceeding is indicated is widely recognized. See Elmo Div. v. Dixon,
348 F.2d 342, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Zirin v. McGinnes, 282 F.2d 113, 115 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 921 (1960); Board of Supervisors v. Fleming, 265 F.2d 736, 737(5th Cir. 1959) (per curiam); Frost v. Garrison, 201 F. Supp. 389, 391 (D. Wyo.
1962); Burack v. State Liquor Author., 160 F. Supp. 161, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
Even when statutory review is made exclusive, an injunctive proceeding may be the
proper mode of review when the statutory means of review is unavailable. See Oeste-
reich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 235-39 (1968); Leedom v. Kyne,
358 U.S. 184, 184-91 (1958). For a discussion of the limitations on this line of rea-
soning, see Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968) (per curiam); Boire v. Greyhound
Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 477-82 (1964). See generally K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TXr 445 (3d ed. 1972).
15. The district court interpreted the review sections of the Act to permit equitable
relief in these circumstances. Provisions for review are set forth in FIFRA H§ 4(c)-
(d), 7 U.S.C. H9 135(c)-(d) (1970).
16. Dow Chem. Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 477 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1973).
17. See note 6 supra.
18. See note 15 supra (FIFRA review provisions).
19. See, e.g., Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act § 16, 7 U.S.C. § 136n(Supp. H, 1972); Natural Gas Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 717r (1970); Federal Power Act
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requirements of reviewability is that the action be "ripe.""°  When an
agency action takes the form of an order, 21 it is necessary that the
order be "final" to be "ripe" for review.22  For an order to be "final,"
§ 313, 16 U.S.C. § 8251 (1970); Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 701(f), 21
U.S.C. § 371(f) (1970). See also Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Ac-
tion: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claims for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 429 n.12
(1973); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HAPV. L.
REV. 645, 655 nn.33-34 (1973). But see Veteran's Benefits Act § 8(a), 38 U.S.C. §
211(a) (1970); Renegotiation Act § 403(c)(1), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1191(c)(1) (1970)
(barring de novo judicial review of administrative action).
20. "In its most general sense ripeness is not a requirement of the administrative
action to be reviewed but of the judicial controversy between the plaintiff and the
agency." L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 395 (1965).
In Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), the Court, to establish
ripeness, made a twofold inquiry: first, whether the issues tendered were appropriate
for judicial resolution, and second, whether serious hardship would befall the parties
if judicial relief was denied at that point in the process. Accord, Gardner v. Toilet
Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167, 170 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158,
162 (1967); Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1205 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 303 F. Supp. 241, 255 (W.D. Mich. 1969), aff'd on other
grounds, 422 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1970).
For a further elaboration of the concept of ripeness in administrative law, see Flem-
ming v. Florida Citrus Exch., 358 U.S. 153, 168 (1958); Frozen Food Express v.
United States, 351 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1956); Textile & Apparel Group v. FTC, 410 F.2d
1052, 1052-54 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 910 (1969); American Home Prods.
Corp. v. Finch, 303 F. Supp. 448 (D. Del. 1969).
21. Administrative actions may take essentially two forms, the "rule" and the "or-
der."
A rule is the product of rule making, and rule making is the part of the ad-
ministrative process that resembles a legislature's enactment of a statute. An
order is the product of adjudication and adjudication is the part of the admin-
istrative process that resembles a court's decision of a case.
K. DAVIS, supra note 14, at 123. Administrative Procedure Act § 2, 5 U.S.C. § 551
(1970) states:
(4) "rule means the whole or part of an agency statement of general or par-
ticular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or pre-
scribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice re-
quirements of an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the fu-
ture of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganization
thereof, process, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of
valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing;
(5) "rule making" means agency process for formulating, amending or re-
pealing a rule;
(6) "order" means the whole or part of a final disposition, whether affirma-
tive, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter
other than rule making but including licensing . ...
22. The requirement of a "final" order may be imposed explicitly by statute. See,
e.g., Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act § 16, 7 U.S.C. § 136n (Supp. II,
1972); Immigration and Nationality Act § 106a, 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1970); National
Labor Relations Act § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/13
170 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1974:164
however, it need not be the last possible administrative order in a pro-
ceeding.2" Rather, the definition is flexible,24 and, in designating an
The Administrative Procedure Act also requires that an order be "final" for purposes
of review. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970). See Ab-
bott Labs., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149-50 (1967); Klein v. Commissioner of
Patents, 474 F.2d 821, 824 (4th Cir. 1973); Samuel B. Franklin & Co. v. SEC, 290
F.2d 719, 723-24 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 889 (1961); State ex rel. Blanken-
ship v. Smith, 312 F. Supp. 770, 771 (W.D. Okla. 1970); Bucks County Cable T.V.,
Inc. v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Pa. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 427
F.2d 438 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
The controlling statute may provide for review of an agency "action" or "order" and
the court will construe such language as requiring a "final" "action" or "order." See
FPC v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375, 383-85 (1938); United Gas Pipe Line
Co. v. FPC, 206 F.2d 842, 844-45 (3d Cir. 1953); Algonquin Gas Transmission Co.
v. FPC, 201 F.2d 334, 337-38 (1st Cir. 1953); Aluminum Co. of America v. FPC,
130 F.2d 445, 447-48 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Indiana .& Mich. Elec. Co. v. FPC, 224 F.
Supp. 166, 169 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
23. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416-18
(1942); Goodman v. Public Serv. Comn'n, 467 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Northeast
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 345 F.2d 662, 664-66 (1st Cir. 1965); Lam Man Chi v.
Bouchard, 314 F.2d 664, 670 (3d Cir. 1963); Trans-Pacific Freight Conf. of Japan v.
Federal Maritime Bd., 302 F.2d 875, 877-78 (1962); Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. FPC, 255
F.2d 860 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 837 (1958).
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 589-90 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), the court held that the Administrator's refusal to act on a request for sus-
pension of a product's registration pursuant to FIFRA was reviewable. It was further
stated that the test for "finality" for purposes of review was not whether the order was
the last possible administrative order contemplated by the statutory scheme, but rather
whether the order imposed an obligation or denied a legal right with consequences suf-
ficient to warrant review. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 465 F.2d 528, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Pax Co. v. United States, 454 F.2d 93, 97-98 (10th Cir. 1972), provides a specific
example of an "early" final order issued in a FIFRA proceeding. The section of
FIFRA requiring the registrant to prepay the costs of an advisory committee was held
invalid. The court reasoned that the requirement of prepayment of such costs affected
the registrant immediately upon its request for an advisory committee, and was thus
effective long before the final determination of the Administrator.
24. It has been held that an order, otherwise "final" but subject to presidential
nullification, is not "final" for purposes of review. See Trans World Airlines v. CAB,
184 F.2d 66, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 941 (1951); Employers
Group v. National War Labor Bd., 143 F.2d 145, 151 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 735 (1944); Pan Am. Co. v. CAB, 121 F.2d 810, 814 (2d Cir. 1941); Grace
Line, Inc. v. Panama Canal Co., 143 F. Supp. 539, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd on
other grounds, 243 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1957), rev'd, 356 U.S. 309 (1958).
"Final" administrative orders have been defined as those orders which impose an ob-
ligation, deny a right, or fix some legal relationship as a consummation of the legal
process. Chicago & S. Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948);
Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 131 (1939); United States v. Los
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order "final," courts take account of such factors as the imminence
of irreparable injury if review is denied25 and the appropriateness of
the issues for judicial resolution.26 In the case of preliminary orders
such as cancellation,27 which pose only a threat to the plaintiff, courts,
in weighing the aforementioned factors, rarely allow review.28
Angeles & S.L.R.R., 273 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1927); National Van Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 326 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1964); Lam Man Chi v. Bouchard, 314 F.2d 664, 670
(3d Cir. 1963); Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. FPC, 255 F.2d 860, 863 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 837 (1958).
It has also been stated that an order is final if issued at a time when judicial review
will not disrupt the process of administrative decision-making and legal rights or obli-
gations have been determined by agency action. Port of Boston Marine Terminal
Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970); ICC v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
383 U.S. 576, 602 (1966).
25. Courts have stated that the test for finality is whether judicial review is needed
to protect the plaintiff from irreparable injury threatened by the "administrative rulings
which attach legal consequences to action taken in advance of other hearings and adju-
dications that may follow." Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S.
407, 425 (1942) (disruption and serious damage to plaintiff's business held sufficient
injury to warrant review); Trans-Pacific Freight Conf. of Japan v. Federal Maritime
Bd., 302 F.2d 875, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (obstruction of plaintiffs function as private
regulatory agency held sufficient injury to warrant review); Isbrandtsen Co. v. United
States, 211 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954) (virtual removal
of plaintiff from shipping market resulting in serious injury to his business held suffi-
cient injury to warrant review); see National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council
v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 698-703 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (choice between criminal penalties
or extensive costs to plaintiff's business held sufficient injury to warrant review); B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 829, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (choice between treble
damage suits and serious disruption of plaintiffs business held sufficient injury to war-
rant review).
26. The court may refuse to review orders relating to an agency's case-handling
procedures. See Coca-Cola Co. v. FTC, 475 F.2d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 1973); Bristol-
Myers Co. v. FTC, 469 F.2d 1116, 1118 (2d Cir. 1972); Thermal Ecology Must Be
Preserved v. AEC, 433 F.2d 524, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Bokat v. Tidewater Equip.
Co., 363 F.2d 667, 671-72 (5th Cir. 1966); Chicago Auto. Trade Ass'n v. Madden,
328 F.2d 766, 769 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964); United Airlines v.
CAB, 228 F.2d 13, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
Courts may view issues concerning the setting of rates or charges as inappropriate
for review. See Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1249 (1st Cir. 1970); Rural Elec.
Adm'n v. Northern States Power Co., 373 F.2d 686, 700 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 945 (1967).
Courts may also consider certain issues inappropriate for review due to inadequacy
of the record. See Veterans of Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 380 U.S. 513, 514 (1965); American Comm. for Protection of Foreign
Born v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 380 U.S. 503, 503-05 (1965).
27. See note 6 supra.
28. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950) (Court found
no violation of due process and held injury to reputation of plaintiff's business insuffi-
cient to warrant review); Chicago & S. Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/13
172 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1974:164
Certain difficulties have arisen in interpreting the final order re-
quirement.2" The first stems from the fact that a court, in applying
the requirement, may review what is in form an interlocutory order,
if the order is in substance a final determination of individual rights.A0
Thus, what one court might term a "final order" another may term
"interlocutory but reviewable," while both courts will consider essen-
(1948) (Court found no serious injury to plaintiff's business where order had not yet
received presidential approval necessary for enforcement); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Brenner, 383 F.2d 514, 517-18 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042 (1968)
(court found no violation of plaintiff's right to participate in patent interference pro-
ceeding); Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 271, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(costs to plaintiff of additional administrative evidentiary hearing held insufficient in-
jury to warrant review); Turkel v. FDA, 334 F.2d 844, 846 (6th Cir. 1964) (cost of
application procedure and hearing held insufficient injury to warrant review); Pepsico,
Inc. v. FTC, 343 F. Supp. 396, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (failure of Commission to join
certain parties in agency proceeding held insufficient injury to warrant review where
parties still had right to intervene); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 256 F. Supp.
136, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (court found neither violation of due process nor contra-
vention of the Administrative Procedure Act where further administrative alternatives
were still open to plaintiffs).
29. Some confusion may result because the problem of finality often appears simul-
taneously with that of exhaustion of administrative remedies, but the two can be distin-
guished. The doctrine of finality requires that for an interlocutory agency order to
be judicially reviewable, it must be definitive, deal with the merits of the administrative
proceeding, and have such an effect on the plaintiff's rights as to cause irreparable in-
jury if not subject to judicial review. The doctrine of exhaustion requires that the
plaintiff utilize all available administrative remedies prior to seeking review by the
courts. See generally 3 K. DAvis, ADimINIsTRATE LAwv TREATISE § 20.01 et seq.
1958 ed., 1965 Supp.); L JAFFE, supra note 20, at 424-58; Jaffe, The Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies, 12 BUFFALO L. Rnv. 327 (1963). The doctrine of exhaus-
tion, then, requires specific action on the part of the plaintiff, while the doctrine of
finality requires specific action on the part of the administrative agency.
There may be exhaustion of administrative remedies without finality where, for ex-
ample, there is a refusal on the part of the administrative agency to take any action
whatsoever. There may be finality without exhaustion when, upon issuance of an
agency order, the plaintiff fails to exercise his option for administrative review within
the statutory time limit and the order becomes final. Often the situation arises, how-
ever, in which the plaintiff seeks judicial review with administrative review still avail-
able. There are concurrent problems of exhaustion and finality when the administra-
tive review not exercised will provide a remedy for the plaintiff.
The supporting rationale of both doctrines is essentially the same: to develop a com-
plete record prior to judicial review; to avoid costly duplication of effort by the courts
and administrative agencies; and to prevent impediment of the carefully designed ad-
ministrative process.
30. Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 477 F.2d 1201, 1205 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Brenner, 383 F.2d 514, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249
U.S. 557 (1919).
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tially the same factors in deciding whether to review.3 A second prob-
lem arises in determining what constitutes the irreparable injury which
is requisite to finality when a plaintiff seeks review of an interlocutory
order."- Courts now seem to regard an order which immediately
causes the plaintiff to face the choice of either taking action which
is significantly disadvantageous to him (e.g., withdrawing a product
from the market) or incurring the risk of criminal penalties, as having
sufficient impact to warrant review.33 However, courts will balance
other factors against the plaintiff's injury in determining whether re-
view should be granted; therefore, the requisite injury may differ from
case to case. 34
In Pax Co. of Utah v. United States3 5 the Tenth Circuit held
that, pursuant to FIFRA, judicial review of a cancellation order was
unavailable because the order presented only a threat of injury, and
31. An order has been held interlocutory but reviewable when it had an impact
on the rights of the party and was of such a nature as would cause irreparable injury
if not challenged. Green County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 425-26 (2d Cir.
1972); Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 285 F.2d 737, 739 (10th Cir. 1960). See
also Atlanta Gas & Light Co. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 338 F. Supp. 1039, 1049
(N.D. Ga. 1972), in which the court held that the power to review FPC action did
not apply only to final actions, but to any order that was definitive, dealt with the
merits of the proceeding before the Commission, and had such an impact on plaintiff's
rights as to cause irreparable injury if not challenged. Compare the cases above with
those cited at notes 24-25 supra.
32. See notes 25 & 28 supra and accompanying text.
33. See Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 (1967); Abbott Labs., Inc.
v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council
v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 698-703 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Independent Broker-Dealer's Trade
Ass'n v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132, 141-42 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971);
Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated
as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). But see International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd,
347 U.S. 222 (1954); Public Utilities Comm'n v. United Airlines, 346 U.S. 402
(1953).
34. For a listing of additional factors that a court may consider, see Nor-Am Agri-
cultural Prods., Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1133, 1144 (7th Cir. 1970), citing Saferstein,
Non-reviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82
HARV. L. Rnv. 367 (1968).
35. 454 F.2d 93 (10th Cir.), rev'g 324 F. Supp. 1335 (D. Utah 1972). The
Secretary of Agriculture cancelled registration of the company's herbicide and Pax re-
quested advisory committee review. Before the committee could meet, however, Pax
filed suit in federal district court alleging arbitrary and capricious conduct on the part
of the Secretary. The district court assumed jurisdiction and granted injunctive relief
based upon findings that there was no adequate administrative remedy, that there was
imminent irreparable injury to the plaintiff, and that preliminary notices of cancellation
are "final" orders.
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the last possible agency order had not been issued.80 The considera-
tions influencing the court's holding were lack of injury to the regis-
trant37 and the congressional purpose in delegating power to the ad-
ministrative agency.38
The Seventh Circuit in Nor-Am Agricultural Products v. Hardin3 0
held that the administrative process established by FIFRA is subject
to judicial review exclusively by the appropriate appellate court after
a "final" order has been entered. 0 The court further held that a sus-
pension order is not "final" because the statutory scheme of FIFRA
indicates a congressional intent to compel the registrant to follow the
detailed procedures for administrative review. 41 The policy support-
ing the Act42 and the relative insignificance of the injury to the regis-
trant when weighed against the possible injury to the public,43 were
primary factors in the court's reasoning.
36. The court did hold invalid the one section of FIFRA requiring the registrant
to prepay the cost of an advisory committee. Id. at 97-98. See note 23 supra.
37. The court found that, since Pax still had a right to both a hearing and judicial
review as provided by statute, there was no assurance that Pax would lose or, in fact,
suffer any harm whatsoever. 454 F.2d at 96-97.
38. The court indicated that the merits of the controversy should be tried on the
basis of the expertise prescribed by Congress and that Congress was careful and delib-
erate in constructing the statute to afford complete due process. Id. at 96.
39. 435 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir.), rev'g 435 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. dis-
missed, 402 U.S. 935 (1971). The Secretary of Agriculture suspended the registration
of plaintiff's fungicide. Plaintiff sought immediate injunctive relief in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The court issued an injunction re-
straining suspension and a three-judge panel of the appellate court affirmed with one
judge dissenting. The panel found that the order, placing plaintiff in the position of
either immediately suspending activities which had theretofore been lawful or risking
criminal penalties, was sufficiently final to warrant review. The Secretary appealed for
a rehearing en bane and obtained a reversal.
40. Id. at 1155-58.
41. Of primary importance to the court were respect for the will of Congress, de-
sire to prevent delay of the administrative proceedings, and the fact that judicial review
would nullify the need for the further agency action clearly prescribed by statute, Id.
at 1155-60.
42. In reaching its conclusion, the court stressed the expertise of the administrative
agency, the highly discretionary nature of an order that concerns public health and
safety, and the need for administrative autonomy. Id.
43. The court recognized the injury to Nor-Am in a situation in which the com-
pany had to choose between withdrawing its product from the market or facing severe
statutory penalties. But the court reasoned that where public health and safety demand
the emergency removal of a commodity from the market, even unrecoverable financial
losses incurred during litigation must be considered an expense of the litigation itself.
Id. at 1160. Litigation expenses do not constitute the type of economic injury requisite
to judicial review of an interlocutory agency order. See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
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The Nor-Am holding was strongly criticized in Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus44 (EDF). The District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals held that an order denying suspension of
registration on the ground that there was no threat of "imminent haz-
ard" is sufficiently final in its impact to warrant judicial review.4'
The court based its decision on the determination that FIFRA contains
no conclusive indication that Congress intended to limit review to
orders made after advisory committee proceedings and a public hear-
ing.46 Having reached this result, the court found no reason to dis-
tinguish a decision to suspend from a refusal to suspend and concluded
that both were reviewable.17  The court did, however, distinguish de-
cisions to issue cancellation orders as nonreviewable, because they
"merely set in motion the administrative process that terminates in a
reviewable final order."48
In Dow, the court considered two elements in determining that the
challenged cancellation order was not "final." The court looked first
to the congressional intent as evidenced by the carefully designed, pro-
building Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1938); Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gardner, 381
F.2d 271, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Turkel v. FDA, 334 F.2d 844, 846 (6th Cir. 1964),
cert. dened, 379 U.S. 990 (1965); Clark v. Lindemann & Hoverson Co., 88 F.2d 59,
60 (7th Cir. 1937); Pittsburgh & W.V. Ry. v. ICC, 280 F. 1014, 1015-16 (D.C. Cir.
1922).
44. 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Plaintiffs requested the Secretary of Agri-
culture to suspend registration of all pesticides containing DDT. No action was taken
on the request and the plaintiffs sought review in the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals. In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093
(D.C. Cir. 1970), the court held that the Secretary's silence on the request for suspen-
sion was tantamount to a denial of that request and that the denial was reviewable as
a final order. The court remanded the case to the Secretary who then issued an order
refusing to suspend. The plaintiffs again sought review.
45. 439 F.2d at 592.
46. Id. at 591. Two facts supported the court's determination. First, judicial re-
view pursuant to FIFRA is available to those who have no right to advisory committee
review or a public hearing, specifically, "any person who will be adversely affected by
such order may obtain judicial review." 7 U.S.C. § 135b(d) (1970). Secondly, a
manufacturer himself may in some situations have a right to judicial review of an ad-
ministrative decision that will not be considered in subsequent administrative proceed-
ings. The court gave as an example the case of the manufacturer who concedes to
a cancellation order, but contests a determination that his product warrants suspension
as an imminent hazard.
47. 439 F.2d at 591. The court reasoned that the administrative review proceed-
ings available subsequent to suspension are equally available after a refusal to suspend.
48. Id. at 592. Because suspension orders also set in motion the administrative re-
view process, this may seem a facile distinction. But see note 58 infra and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the rationale underlying the differentiation.
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tracted administrative process and reasoned that the proceedings pro-
vided ample remedy 9 and were based on the necessity to develop a
complete record when dealing with recondite issues. Secondly, the
court stressed the lack of irreparable injury to Dow. Dow had alleged
that it had been injured through deprivation of a proper statutory deci.
sion and appeal51 and that it had suffered economic harm.52 The
court found no merit in the first contention 8 and deemed the second
claim insufficient to warrant review.5 4  While recognizing the econom-
ic pressures on Dow, the court stated that only a threat of economic
injury existed and that there was no assurance that the company would
ultimately fail in the administrative proceeding.r 5
Dow, together with Pax and Nor-Am, supports the proposition that
when the purpose of FIFRA-protection of the public and environ-
ment-is frustrated by judicial review sought on the ground of econom-
ic pressures placed on the registrant by the requirements of the stat-
utory scheme, such pressures are insufficient to warrant review of the
agency order. The court in EDF could have adopted the principles
underlying this position by distinguishing Nor-Am on the ground that
a suspension order results in injury to a private economic interest,
while refusal to suspend, as in EDF, threatens public health and safe-
ty."s The court refused to do so, however, reasoning that once the
Secretary has made a decision with respect to suspension, whether he
decides to grant or deny suspension, the determination of the "immi-
49. 477 F.2d at 1323, citing Pax Co. v. Hardin, 454 F.2d 93, 96 (10th Cir. 1972).
50. 477 F.2d at 1325-26.
51. See note 13 supra.
52. Dow contended that the cancellation order had caused adverse economic conse-
quences to the company. The agricultural extension services in Texas, Arkansas, and
Louisiana removed 2,4,5-T from their official 1971 lists of recommended chemicals for
weed control, resulting in decreased use of the product in the heart of the nation's rice-
growing area. Furthermore, public utilities in at least thirteen states stopped or cur-
tailed use of 2,4,5-T for non-agricultural purposes. As a result of the cancellation and
the state and private action in reliance on it, a 36% drop in Dow's 2,4,5-T sales oc-
curred between 1970 and 1971. Appellee's Brief at 41-42, Dow Chem. Co. v. Ruckels-
haus, 477 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1973).
53. 477 F.2d at 1326.
54. Id.
55. Id. Other cases have denied review on the ground that there was no assurance
that the plaintiff would ultimately fail in the administrative proceedings. Coca-Cola
Co. v. FTC, 475 F.2d 299, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1973); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 469
F.2d 1116, 1118 (2d Cir. 1972); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 711 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Pepsico, Inc. v. FTC, 343 F. Supp. 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
56. 439 F.2d at 591.
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nence' of the hazard to the public is "final." 7  Because subsequent
administrative proceedings will not address the question of imminent
hazard," the focus of the court in deciding whether to review should
not be on the availability of further administrative review, but on the
impact of the imminent hazard determination. 9 The court concluded
by stating that a "threat of economy injury has always been regarded
as sufficient. . . for the purpose of finding an order final and review-
able.""o
The District of Columbia Circuit, then, advocates judicial review of
determinations as to "imminent hazard" where the requisite economic
injury to the plaintiff is present. This position is consistent with recent
decisions concerning the character of irreparable harm required for
review. 61 Such a stand, however, would commit to the courts an issue
which would be better left to the expertise of the administrative
agency, particularly at this preliminary stage where there would be no
record to aid the court in its decision.62
The court in EDF, while differing generally in its interpretation of
the review provisions of FIFRA,63 adopted a view consonant with that
of the Pax, Nor-Am, and Dow courts as to the nonreviewability of can-
cellation orders. Although the practical effect on the registrant of a
cancellation order may be severe, 64 it is merely the incunabulum of
the administrative process. To consider such a preliminary order
"final" for purposes of judicial review could result in the inefficacy
57. Id.
58. The court reasoned that the administrative proceedings initiated subsequent to
a suspension order no longer deal with the issue of whether the plaintiff's product pre-
sents an imminent hazard to the public, but whether it complies with the Act and, if
not, whether it should be removed from the market. The second of these two distinct
issues, compliance with the Act, is also the subject of the administrative proceedings
which follow a cancellation order. However, because the initial determination made
by the Administrator in a decision with respect to cancellation is whether the product
complies with the Act, see note 6 supra, the initial determination will be the subject
of subsequent administrative proceedings. Hence, while there is no need to provide for
judicial review in the case of cancellation, it is necessary in the case of suspension.
59. 439 F.2d at 591.
60. Id. at 592.
61. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
62. The court recognized the problem of the absence of an advisory committee re-
port and hearing record, but stated that this would not preclude judicial review, but
merely limit its scope. 439 F.2d at 591.
63. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
64. See note 52 supra.
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of the administration of FIFRA as well as serious injury to the public
and environment.
While there is clear agreement among the circuits as to the non-
reviewability of cancellation orders, the difficult question still remains:
What position will the Eighth Circuit take as to the reviewability of
suspension orders? The Dow court, in examining the reviewability
only of cancellation orders, considered the extent of the injury to the
tlaintiff and the need for a complete administrative record in review-
ing complex issues which affect the public health and safety. While
both factors may assume increased significance in suspension cases,
the court, by distinguishing suspension cases such as Nor-Am and
EDF, gave no indication of which factor may take precedence.
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